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CLI-based Configuration Guide - Security

AR100, AR120, AR150, AR160, AR200, AR1200, AR2200, AR3200, and AR3600 V200R010

This document provides the basic concepts, configuration procedures, and configuration examples in different application scenarios of the network management feature supported by the device.
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Defense Against ARP Spoofing Attacks

Defense Against ARP Spoofing Attacks

As shown in Figure 11-8, UserA, UserB, and UserC use Switch to connect to the gateway to access the Internet.

Generally, when UserA, UserB, and UserC go online and exchange ARP packets, ARP entries are created on UserA, UserB, UserC, and the gateway. At the same time, an attacker can send bogus ARP packets to UserA, UserB, UserC, or the gateway in the broadcast domain to modify ARP entries, intercept information, and interrupt communication.

Figure 11-8  Defending against ARP spoofing attacks

To avoid the preceding problems, deploy ARP spoofing defense functions on the gateway, including rate ARP entry fixing, strict ARP learning, and gratuitous ARP packet sending.

  • After ARP entry fixing is deployed and the gateway learns an ARP entry for the first time, the gateway does not change the ARP entry, but only updates part of the entry, or sends a unicast ARP Request packet to check the validity of the ARP packet for updating the entry. This function prevents ARP entries from being modified by bogus ARP packets.

  • After strict ARP learning is deployed, the gateway learns only the ARP Reply packets in response to the ARP Request packets that it has sent. This prevents ARP entries from being modified by bogus ARP packets.

  • After gratuitous ARP packet sending is deployed, the gateway periodically sends ARP Request packets with its IP address as the destination IP address to update the gateway MAC address in ARP entries. This function ensures that packets of authorized users are forwarded to the gateway and prevents hackers from intercepting these packets.

Updated: 2019-08-07

Document ID: EDOC1100034077

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